Default Risk and Risk Averse International Investors by Lizarazo, Sandra
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Default Risk and Risk Averse
International Investors
Sandra Lizarazo
24. January 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20794/
MPRA Paper No. 20794, posted 20. February 2010 16:45 UTC
Default Risk and Risk Averse International Investors
Sandra Valentina Lizarazo†
First draft: March, 2005
This draft: January, 2010
Abstract
This paper develops a model of debt and default for small open economies that interact
with risk averse international investors. The model developed here extends the recent work
on the analysis of endogenous default risk to the case in which international investors are
risk averse agents with decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). By incorporating risk
averse investors who trade with a single emerging economy, the present model offers two
main improvements over the standard case of risk neutral investors: i.) the model exhibits
a better fit of debt-to-output ratio and ii.) the model explains a larger proportion and
volatility of the spread between sovereign bonds and riskless assets. The paper shows
that if investors have DARA preferences, then the emerging economy’s default risk, capital
flows, bond prices and consumption are a function not only of the fundamentals of the
economy—as in the case of risk neutral investors—but also of the level of financial wealth
and risk aversion of the international investors. In particular, as investors become wealthier
or less risk averse, the emerging economy becomes less credit constrained. As a result, the
emerging economy’s default risk is lower, and its bond prices and capital inflows are higher.
Additionally, with risk averse investors, the risk premium in the asset prices of the sovereign
countries can be decomposed into two components: a base premium that compensates the
investors for the probability of default (as in the risk neutral case) and an “excess” premium
that compensates them for taking the risk of default.
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1 Introduction
This paper extends the recent work in endogenous default risk to the case in which in-
ternational investors are risk averse agents whose preferences exhibit decreasing absolute
risk aversion (DARA). The current paper develops a model of debt and default for a small
open economy that interacts with risk averse international investors. This model is used to
account for nine stylized facts regarding emerging financial markets:
(i) Emerging economies experience a loss of access to international capital markets and
large reversals of their current account deficits in times of crises.1
(ii) Emerging economies’ domestic interest rates are counter-cyclical.2
(iii) Default on sovereign debts occurs in equilibrium.3
(iv) Emerging economies’ credit ratings are negatively correlated with their income level
and their growth rate, and positively correlated with the size of their external debt.4
(v) Emerging economies’ estimated default probabilities do not account for all of the yield
spreads in their sovereign bonds.5
(vi) The proportion of sovereign yield spreads explained by emerging economies’ own fun-
damentals is smaller for riskier sovereign bonds than for investment grade bonds.6
(vii) Investors’ financial performance and their net foreign asset position in emerging
economies are positively correlated.7
(viii) Emerging economies’ credit spreads are positively correlated with spreads of corporate
junk bonds from developed countries.8
1The literature on “sudden-stops” has focused on explaining the dynamics of the loss of access to inter-
national capital markets that emerging economies experience during periods of crises.
2Uribe and Yue (2006) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005) focus on the counter-cyclical behavior of domestic
interest rate for emerging markets.
3Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) and Reinhart et al. (2003) document and empirically analyze default
events.
4Cantor and Pecker (1996) analyzes the determinants of credit ratings.
5Westphalen (2001) and Broner et al.(2005) have considered bond spreads and the role of the probability
of default in the determination of such spreads.
6See, for example, Cantor and Pecker (1996), Cunningham et al.(2001), Westphalen (2001), and Kamin
and von Kleist (1999).
7See for example Goldberg (2001), Hernandez et al.(2001), FitzGerald and Krolzig (2003), and Mody
and Taylor (2003).
8See, for example, FitzGerald and Krolzig (2003), Ferruci et al.(2004), and Mody and Taylor (2004).
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(ix) Sovereign bond spreads across emerging economies are highly correlated.9
In the model presented here, three types of agents interact through international fi-
nancial emerging markets: developed economies’ agents, emerging economies’ agents, and
international financial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries or investors take the form
of mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, etc. These agents invest in emerging financial
markets in the name of developed economies’ agents—i.e. developed economies’ agents are
able to invest in emerging market assets by holding shares of mutual funds, pensions or
hedge funds. Since intermediaries act in tandem with developed economies’ agents, these
two actors will not be modeled separately. Therefore only two types agents will be explicitly
modeled, the agents of the emerging economies and international investors.
It is assumed that all of the agents of the emerging economy are identical, all the
international investors are identical, and that none of these agents follow mixed strategies.
Under these assumptions, it is possible to focus on the representative agent of each type.
For her part, the representative investor is a risk averse agent. This agent solves a dynamic
portfolio problem in which she decides the optimal allocation of her portfolio between bonds
of the emerging economy and riskless assets denominated as T-Bills. On the other side of
the market, the representative agent of the emerging economy is also a risk averse agent
who solves a dynamic optimization problem. Each period, this agent receives an stochastic
endowment and chooses her consumption and savings subject to her budget constraint. The
emerging economy borrows or saves by trading one-period non-contingent bonds with the
representative investor. The interaction between the two parties determines the equilibrium
price of the bonds in the emerging economy.
On the side of the emerging economy, there is limited liability. While the representative
investor is able to commit to repay any debt that she might have, the representative agent
of the emerging economy is not. In this case, the emerging economy might default on her
debts. If she defaults, she is excluded from international credit markets temporarily.
Because of the enforcement problem the price of the bonds of the economy depends
on the likelihood of repayment of the debt. This likelihood of repayment by the economy
depends on the borrowing of the economy. Both the representative investor, and the repre-
sentative agent of the economy take as given the price function of the emerging economy’s
non-contingent discount bonds, q.
9See, for example, Valdes (1996), Baig and Goldfajn (1998), Baig and Goldfajn (2000), and Forbes and
Rigobon (1999).
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As laid out here, the asset market is imperfect in three different ways. First, there
is a one-sided commitment problem which implies that debt contracts with the emerging
economy are not enforceable. Second, markets are incomplete because the only traded assets
are one period no-contingent bonds, and risk free T-Bills. Therefore the representative
investor is not able to insure away the income uncertainty specific to the emerging country.
Third, the market structure of the financial market is non-competitive: investors form a
cartel that colludes to punish any deviant borrower through the exclusion from international
credit markets.
By relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality, and allowing for wealth effects on the
side of the international investors, the model presented here attempts to better match the
facts of international financial markets during the last two decades of the 20th century.
These facts are only partially explained in the existing sovereign debt literature. Under the
assumption that investors are risk neutral, previous models of endogenous sovereign risk
have explained stylized facts (i) through (iv).10 As a result of incorporating risk averse
investors with DARA preferences, the model presented here endogenously explains all of
the stylized facts listed above.
The present model explains stylized facts (v) through (ix) as follows. First, interna-
tional investors demand an excess risk premium in order to willingly take the risk of default
embodied in the emerging economies’ sovereign bonds (i.e. a risk averse agent would only
take a risk that is actuarially favorable.). Therefore the present model is able to account
for stylized fact (v): the price of the emerging economy’s bonds is lower than the world
price of riskless bonds adjusted by the emerging economy’s default probability. This result
is consistent with the findings of the empirical finance literature on sovereign bond spreads.
Those findings suggest that under the assumption of risk neutral investors and competi-
tive financial markets, the price of sovereign bonds cannot be completely explained by the
estimated probabilities of default.11
Second, as risk averse agents, international investors demand a higher risk premium
for higher levels of risk—above the premium predicted solely by the probability of default.
10This literature begins with Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). More recent examples include Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006), Yue(2006), Bai and Zhang (2006), Arellano (2008), Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza
(2008) and Cuadra and Sapriza(2008).
11An alternative explanation exists which does not depend on risk aversion. Sovereign bonds could be
mispriced under the assumption that international investors do not take prices as given. However this
assumption only explains stylized fact (v). Stylized facts (vi) through (ix) cannot be accounted for by a
model in which portfolio allocations to each emerging country are independent of the wealth of the investors
and the overall risk of the portfolio.
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With risk averse investors, the risk premium can be decomposed in two components: a
base premium that compensates the investors for the probability of default and an “excess”
premium that compensates them for taking the risk of default.12 Therefore the present
model is able to account for stylized fact (vi): The proportion of sovereign yield spreads
explained by default probabilities is smaller for riskier sovereign bonds than for less risky
bonds. This result is consistent with the empirical regularity reported in several papers:
that spreads in investment grade bonds can be explained to a larger extent by emerging
economies’ fundamentals than spreads in speculative grade bonds.
Third, since investors’ preferences exhibit DARA, these agents are able to tolerate more
default risk the wealthier they are. Therefore the present model can account for stylized
fact (vii): there is a positive correlation between the representative lender’s wealth and
the lender’s investment in the emerging economy. This result is consistent with empirical
findings which demonstrate a positive relation between proxies of investors wealth (like
developed economies’ output or stock indexes) and capital flows to emerging economies.
Fourth, the endogenous credit limits faced by the emerging economy become increasingly
tight when the lender’s risk aversion increases. This tightening occurs because a more risk
averse investor demands a higher risk premium in order to accept default risk. Therefore, for
any given level of risk aversion of the representative investor, the set of financial contracts
available to the emerging economy is always a subset of the set of contracts available to
an identical economy trading with a less risk averse lender.13 This result is consistent
with stylized fact (viii): whenever investors’ willingness to take risk changes, there must
be a change in the spreads of all risky assets. As a consequence, the spreads of emerging
economies’ sovereign bonds and the spreads of industrialized economies’ junk bonds should
exhibit some co-movement.
Fifth, under DARA preferences, investors have a higher tolerance for risk when they are
wealthier. Therefore at higher levels of wealth, these agents demand a smaller risk premium
than at lower levels of wealth in order to take the same amount of default risk. Furthermore,
a smaller risk premium in the emerging economy’s bonds increases the benefits to the
economy of fulfilling its contract. Since these effects reinforce each other, the equilibrium
price of sovereign bonds is an increasing function of investors’ wealth levels. This result
is consistent with the empirical literature on the determination of sovereign credit spreads
12Models with risk neutral investors only capture the base premium.
13A financial contract in this context is the combination of the bond prices and quantities that the emerging
economy can borrow or save.
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for emerging economies,14 and implies that the current model can explain stylized fact
(ix): sovereign bond spreads across emerging economies are highly correlated because the
equilibrium price of the emerging economy’s bonds varies with the representative investor’s
wealth.15
The assumption of DARA preferences on the side of the investors seems to be justified
by the characteristics of the players in emerging financial markets. These players are both
individuals and institutional investors such as banks, mutual funds, hedge funds, pension
funds and insurance companies. For the case of individual investors, it is straightforward to
assume that these agents are risk averse. They can be treated as the representative agent
of developed economies; it is standard practice in the literature to treat these agents as risk
averse. In the case of institutional investors the assumption of risk aversion is somewhat
more difficult, but nevertheless quite plausible. For these investors, risk aversion may follow
from two sources: regulations over the composition of their portfolio and the characteristics
of the institutions’ management. Regarding the first source, banks face capital adequacy
ratios; mutual funds face restrictions in their access to leverage against their asset holdings;
and pension funds and insurance companies face strict limits on their exposure to risk.
Regarding the second source, for each class of institutional investor, managers ultimately
make the portfolio allocation decisions. These managers can also be treated as representative
agents of developed economies. Additionally, the remuneration—and therefore the wealth—
of these agents is closely related to the performance of the portfolio that they manage. These
factors suggest that portfolio choices of institutional investors will be consistent with the
choices of agents whose preferences exhibit DARA.
This paper is organized as follows: section 1 is the introduction; section 2 presents the
theoretical model; section 3 characterizes the equilibrium of the model; section 4 discusses
the quantitative implications of the model; and section 5 concludes. Two appendixes provide
proofs of propositions presented in the main text and the algorithm that solves the model.
14For example, Warther (1995), Ferruci et al.(2004), FitzGerald and Krolzig (2003), and Westphalen
(2001).
15This result of the model is consistent with the literature on financial contagion. A large body of empirical
literature presents evidence that financial links play a significant role in explaining simultaneous financial
crises and correlated spreads across emerging economies. See, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998),
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), Kaminsky et al.(2001), and Herna´ndez
and Valdes (2001).
5
2 THE MODEL
The model is a discrete time, infinite horizon model. There are two types of agents in the
model, a representative agent small open economy, and a representative risk averse inter-
national investor. In each period, the emerging economy receives a stochastic endowment
of tradable goods. The representative agent of this economy may smooth her consumption
across periods by trading non-contingent discount bonds with the representative investor.
For her part, the representative investor may trade assets with the emerging country or with
industrialized countries. Thus the investor must choose an optimal allocation of her portfo-
lio between the bonds of the emerging economy and bonds of the industrialized countries,
denominated hereafter as T-Bills.
The market for T-bills, θTB, will not be modeled explicitly. Since debt contracts between
the representative investor and industrialized countries are assumed to be enforceable, the
representative investor is a price taker in the market for T-Bills. The price of T-Bills,
qf , which is not determined endogenously in this context, is assumed to be deterministic.
Therefore T-Bills are riskless assets.
Bonds of emerging economies, b, on the other hand, are risky assets because debt con-
tracts between the representative investor and the emerging economy are not enforceable.
As a consequence, there is a one sided commitment problem. While the representative
investor is able to commit to honor her debt obligations with the emerging economy, the
representative agent of the emerging country is not able to commit to honor her obliga-
tions with international investors. Therefore, in each period, the representative agent of
the emerging economy compares the costs and benefits derived from the repayment of her
obligations. The decision between repayment or default is made individually by each agent
of the emerging economy. Each agent of this economy makes her decision, taking as given
the decision of the other agents. However given that all agents are identical who do not
follow mixed strategies, it is possible to focus attention on the problem of the representative
agent.
If the economy defaults, international investors are able to collude to punish her. As a
consequence of default, it is assumed that investors will collude to exclude the defaulting
country for a random number of periods from the financial markets. Since all investors
behave in the same exact way, it is possible to focus on the representative international
investor.
Both, the representative investor and the representative agent of the economy take as
given the price function of the emerging economy’s non-contingent discount bonds, q.
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2.1 International investors
There are a large but finite number of price-taking identical investors. Investors collude in
order to punish any borrower that defaults on her debts, so that a defaulting country is
temporarily excluded from the financial markets. 16
The representative investor is a risk averse agent whose preferences over consumption
are defined by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) periodic utility function with pa-
rameter γL > 0. The investor has perfect information regarding the income process of the
emerging economy, and in each period the investor is able to observe the realizations of this
endowment.
The representative investor maximizes her discounted expected lifetime utility from
consumption
Max
cLt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtLv
(
cLt
)
(1)
where cL is the investor’s consumption. The periodic utility of this agent is given by
v(cL) = (
cL)1−γ
L
1−γL . The representative investor is endowed with some initial wealth, W0, at
time 0, and in each period, the investor receives an exogenous income X.
Because the representative investor is able to commit to honor her debt, she can borrow
or lend from industrialized countries (which are not explicitly modeled here) by buying
T-Bills at the deterministic risk free world price of qf . The representative investor can also
invest in non-contingent bonds of the emerging economy. These bonds have an endogenously
determined stochastic price of q. In each period, the representative investor faces the budget
constraint
W +X = cL + dqθ′ + qfθTB′ (2)
where W is investors wealth at time t, θ′ is the portfolio allocation to the emerging country
and θTB′ is the investor’s allocation to the riskless asset. d is an indicator variable that
determines the default/repayment state of the emerging economy in the current period. d
takes the value of 1 if both the economy is not under the punishment of exclusion from
financial markets as a result of a default in a previous period and the economy chooses to
repay its debts, and takes a value of 0 otherwise.
It is assumed that investors cannot go short in their investments with emerging
16Empirical evidence suggest that once a country defaults, that country is excluded from the credit market
for an average of 5.4 years (see Gelos, et al. (2004)).
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economies. Therefore whenever the emerging economy is saving, the representative in-
ternational investor receives these savings and invests them completely in T-Bills. The
representative investor does not use these resources to go long in T-Bills. This assumption
implies that θ′ ≥ 0 for all t.17
The law of motion of the representative investor’s wealth is given by
W ′ = d′θ′ + θTB′. (3)
The optimization problem that the representative investor faces can be described as
one in which in each period, t, the representative international investor optimally chooses
her portfolio according to her preferences in order to maximize her discounted expected
lifetime utility from consumption, subject to her budget constraint, the law of motion of
her wealth, and given W0. This dynamic problem can be represented recursively by the
Bellman Equation
V L (s) = max
θ′, θTB′
v
(
cL
)
+EβLV
(
s′
)
(4)
s.t. W +X = cL + dqθ′ + qfθTB′
W ′ = d′θ′ + θTB′
θ′ ≥ 0
cL > 0
W ′ ≥ W (5)
where s is defined as follows:
Definition 1 The state of the world, s, is given by the realization of the emerging economy’s
endowment, y, the emerging economy’s asset position, b, the representative investor’s asset
position or wealth, W , and the variable d which states whether or not the emerging economy
is in default.
17This assumption does not seem to be inconsistent with reality. For example, mutual funds are strictly
restricted by The Investment Company Act in their ability to leverage or borrow against the value of securities
in their portfolio. On the other hand, hedge funds and other types of investors face no such restrictions.
Because of these regulations it seems reasonable to make the simplifying assumption that international
investors are able to leverage the riskless asset, θTB , but must have a non-negative position in the emerging
economy’s asset.
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Equation (5) corresponds to the “natural” debt limit discussed in Aiyagari (1994), which
prevents the representative investor from running ponzi games.
Given the assumption that the representative investor is not credit constrained (Equa-
tion (5)) the solution to the stochastic dynamic problem for the representative investor can
be characterized by the following Kunh-Tucker conditions:
For θTB′
qfvcL
(
cL
)
= βLE
[
vcL
(
cL
′)]
+
(
βLE
[
$′
]− qf$) . (6)
For θ′j
q
(
vcL
(
cL
)
+$
)
d = βLE
[(
vcL
(
cL
′)
+$′
)
d′
]
d. (7)
where $ corresponds to the multiplier on the non-negativity constraint for the investors
consumption cL.
For X sufficiently large the non-negativity constraints for the representative investor’s
consumption are not binding at any time (therefore$ = $′ = 0). In such case the investor’s
optimization problem has an interior solution for the portfolio allocation. In what follows
the focus would be on the case in which the solution for the investor’s optimization problem
is interior. In the next sub-section the case of a non interior solution for the investor’s
problem is discussed briefly.
When the non-negativity constraints are not binding the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for
the investor’s problem correspond to the following first order conditions:
qfvcL
(
cL
)
= βLE
[
vcL
(
cL
′)]
. (8)
For θ′j
qvcL
(
cL
)
d = βLE
[
vcL
(
cL
′)
d′
]
d. (9)
According to Equation (8), the investor chooses an allocation to the riskless asset such
that the discounted expected marginal benefit of future consumption equals the marginal
cost of current consumption. Equation (9) determines the allocation of the investor’s re-
sources to the emerging country. Unless the emerging country is not in default state, i.e.
d = 1, the emerging country does not belong in the investment set of the international
investors. If the country is not in default state, then Equation (9) also equates the mar-
ginal cost of allocating wealth to bonds issued by the emerging country to the discounted
expected marginal benefit of this investment. The benefit of this investment is realized
only in those periods in which the emerging economy optimally chooses to repay its debts
(d′ = 1).
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For the case in which d = 1, equation (9) highlights the fact that the endogenous risk of
default by the emerging economy—i.e. the case for which d′ = 0 for some state of the world
in the next period—will reduce the representative investor’s expected marginal benefit of
investing in the emerging economy. Everything else equal, this result will tend to reduce
the allocation of resources to the emerging economy relative to the case where the emerging
economy could commit to repayment.
To understand the role that the investor’s risk aversion plays in this model, it is in-
structive to analyze in detail the determination of the equilibrium price of the emerging
economy’s bonds. It is possible to manipulate equation (9) to get
q =
βLE
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′
]
vcL (cL)
= βL
Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′
]
+EvcL
(
cL
′
)
Ed′
vcL (cL)
=
βLCov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′
]
vcL (cL)
+ qf (1− δ)
=
βLCov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′
]
vcL (cL)
+ qRN .
= ζRA + qRN . (10)
Where Ed′= 1− δ, and δ is the probability that the emerging economy will default in
the next period.
Equation (10) shows that the bond prices of economies that trade financially with risk
averse investors can be decomposed in two different components. The first component qRN
corresponds to the price of the emerging economy’s bonds that would equate the expected
earnings of investing in the economy’s risky bonds to the earnings obtained by investing in
riskless bonds. Given emerging economy’s default decisions for next period d′, this price
would prevail in a world with a risk neutral investor.
qRN = qf (1− δ)
The second component of the emerging economy’s bond prices ζRA corresponds to an
“excess” risk premium that sovereign bonds have to carry in order to induce risk averse
investors to hold them. This term is the principal source of the differences in the results of
this model, and the model of endogenous sovereign risk and risk neutral investors.
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The main determinant of the “excess” risk premium ζRA is the covariance term in
equation (10). When the emerging economy does not find it optimal to default at t+ 1 in
any state of the world, then d′ = 1 for all states. Therefore Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′
]
= 0. On the
other hand, in the case when the emerging economy finds optimal to default at t+ 1 in all
states of the world, then d′ = 0 for all states. Also in this case Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′
]
= 0. But
when at t + 1 there exist some states of the world in which the emerging economy would
optimally choose to default, then for the states in which it is not optimal to default, d′ = 1.
In this case, the wealth of the representative investor at t+ 1 is given by[
W ′ | (d′ = 1)] = θ′ + θTB′
and the wealth of the representative investor at t+ 1 for the states in which the emerging
economy finds it optimal to default (d′ = 0) is given by[
W ′ | (d′ = 0)] = θTB′
It is obvious that [
W ′ | (d′ = 1)] > [W ′ | (d′ = 0)] .
Therefore it must hold that [
cL
′ | (d′ = 1)] ≥ [cL′ | (d′ = 0)]
and by concavity of the investor’s utility function[
vcL
(
cL
′) | (d′ = 1)] ≤ [vcL (cL′) | (d′ = 0)] .
As a consequence, for higher d′, we have lower vcL
(
cL
′
)
. Clearly for this case
Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′)
d′
]
< 0.
Therefore this covariance term is non-positive:
Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′)
d′
]
≤ 0.
Given the fact that the covariance term is non-positive the emerging economy’s bond prices
in this model are lower than the prices that would be observed in a model with risk neutral
investors even in the case in which the probabilities of default were identical in both models.
It is worth examining how the covariance term is affected by four of the relevant variables
in the model: the level of risk aversion of the investor, the investor’s wealth, the investor’s
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exposure to the emerging economy’s debt, and the riskiness of the emerging economy’s
assets.
First, in looking at the investor’s risk aversion, basic asset pricing theory implies that
the more risky an asset looks in the eyes of the investor, the larger should be its “excess”
risk premium ζRA. Clearly, from an investor’s perspective, an asset would seem more risky
the less tolerant of risk is this investor. As a consequence, the covariance term is larger
for higher levels of investors’ risk aversion, γL, or for lower levels of investors’ wealth, W :
the concavity of the investor’s utility function implies that whenever γL is high or when
W is low, the investor’s marginal utility of consumption, vcL
(
cL
′
)
, responds much more to
changes in the investor’s consumption, cL, that are generated by the realized earnings/losses
of the investments in the emerging economy.
Second, in looking at the investor’s wealth, Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of the
covariance term as a function of the investor’s wealth keeping fixed the asset position of
the emerging economy, the economy’s endowment realization, and the investor’s degree of
risk aversion. We see in this figure that the covariance term is more negative the lower is
investor’s wealth. Therefore the “excess” risk premium is larger for low levels of investor’s
wealth. For example, for the case simulated numerically in this paper, when the economy has
the lowest possible realization of income –an income that is 20% below trend–, and her debt
level corresponds to 20.5% of her average income, we observe that whenever the investor’s
wealth corresponds to nearly 3.5 times the average income of the emerging economy, the
“excess” risk premium is 15%; when the investor’s wealth is 0 the “excess” risk premium
increases to almost 40%.
Third, in looking at the investor’s exposure to the emerging economy’s debt, increasing
exposure should increase the “excess” risk premium— even if the intrinsic riskiness of the
economy’s assets could be kept fixed when the level of debt of the economy increases.
The obvious explanation for this result is that even with a fixed default probability for
the economy, a larger exposure to the economy’s debt would increase the riskiness of the
investor’s portfolio, and therefore should command a larger “excess” risk premium.
Figure 2 shows the behavior of the covariance term as function of the economy’s debt
level holding constant the endowment of the economy, and the investor’s wealth and degree
of risk aversion. The probability of default is not held constant; therefore we observe a
non-monotonic behavior of the covariance term and the “excess” risk premium.
For high levels of debt, as a consequence of very high default probabilities bond prices
are zero or very close to zero. For these levels of debt the role of the “excess” risk premium
12
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Figure 1: The Covariance Term and the Investor’s Wealth Level.
is not very relevant. However for not “too high” levels of debt, the covariance term is much
more negative the higher the level of the economy’s debt; in turn more risky investments
command a larger “excess” risk premium. For example, in the figure we observe the case
in which the investor’s wealth level is 2.5% of the average income of the economy, and the
endowment realization of the endowment is again the lowest possible one. In this situation
when the economy borrows very little—almost 0—the “excess” risk premium is close to 20%.
On the other hand, when the economy borrows an amount near to 10% of the economy’s
average income, the “excess” risk premium amounts to a little more than 30%.
Finally, in looking at the riskiness of the emerging economy’s assets, increasing the
riskiness should increase the “excess” risk premium. Figure 3 shows the behavior of the
covariance term as function of the economy’s endowment keeping fixed the asset position
of the economy and the investor’s wealth level and degree of risk aversion. We observe
that for higher income levels, which are empirically associated with low riskiness of the
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Figure 2: The Covariance Term and the Investor’s Exposure to the Emerging Economy.
economy’s assets, the covariance term is less negative; therefore for higher income levels,
the “excess” risk premium is not as large as it is for lower income levels. For example,
when the investor’s wealth is 2.5% of the economy’s expected income and the debt level of
the economy corresponds to 20.5% of the expected income, if the economy has the largest
possible endowment – income that is 20% above trend–, the “excess” risk premium is 26%;
but when the economy hast the lowest possible endowment – income that is 20% below
trend– the “excess” risk premium is 33%.
Leaving aside the behavior of the “excess” risk premium, it is important to note that the
equilibrium probability of default is different in the case of a risk neutral investor, δ (s, b′),
compared to the case of a risk averse investor, δRN (s, b′). Therefore the base risk premium
(the one that compensates the investor for the probability of default) is also larger in the
case of risk averse investors. In fact, for any given s and b′, the probability of default is an
increasing function of the investor’s degree of risk aversion. (This result will be studied in
detail in the next section.)
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Figure 3: The Covariance Term and the the Emerging Economy’s Riskiness.
Figure 4 shows default probability functions for two identical economies that trade with
two different type of investors, one risk neutral and the other risk averse. For a given level
of wealth, Figure 4 shows that when investors are risk averse, the probability of default
is greater than or equal to the probability of default associated with the same levels of
debt when investors are risk neutral. This result holds for all realizations of the economy’s
endowment and all levels of debt.
In conclusion, it is possible to say that for s and b′ given, the price of the bonds issued
by the emerging economy trading with a risk averse investor, q (δ (s, b′)), is always lower or
at best equal to price of the same bonds traded with a representative risk neutral investor,
qRN
(
δRN (s, b′)
)
.
Compared to the case of risk neutral investors, the introduction of risk averse investors
is a step forward in explaining the risk premium in the returns of bonds from emerging
economies. This risk premium seems to be supported empirically since the price of emerging
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Figure 4: Default Probabilities: Risk Neutral vs. Risk Averse Investors.
economies’ bonds seems to be determined by much more than just the opportunity cost of
the funds adjusted by the probability of default of such economies.18 Risk aversion can help
explain this phenomena since a risk averse investor would have to be compensated beyond
the probability of default-adjusted rate of return in order to face the risk of default by an
emerging economy. The higher the degree of risk aversion, the higher the bond spread.
2.1.1 Non-Negativity Constraints in the Investor’s Consumptionand Investor’s
Credit Constraints
The solution to the investor’s optimization problem is not necessarily an interior solution:
18This phenomena is discussed in Cantor and Pecker (1996) and Cunningham et al.(2001) among others.
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Non-Negativity Constraints in the Investor’s Consumption When the non-
negativity constraints for the investor’s consumption are binding, the portfolio allocation is
different from the allocation reached for the interior solution for the investor’s optimization
problem.
In this case the expression for the bond prices of the emerging economy is:
q =
1
1 + $v
cL(cL)
[
q∗ +
βLCov [$′, d′]
vcL(cL)
+
βLE [$′] (1− δ)
vcL(cL)
]
.
where q∗ corresponds to the “optimal” price of the bonds of the emerging economy (i.e.
the one discussed previously and consistent with the existence of an interior solution to
the investor’s portfolio allocation problem), $ is the current period multiplier of the non-
negativity constraint in consumption, and $′ is the lifetime multiplier for the future periods
of the non-negativity constraint in consumption.
Whenever $ > 0 the current period non-negativity constraint in consumption is binding
and the investors need to borrow from international credit markets more than the “optimal”
amount. At the same time investors invest in the emerging economy less than the “optimal”
quantity.
The specific expression for the emerging economy’s bond prices is:
q =
q∗
1 + $v
cL(cL)
.
The equilibrium price of the bonds of the emerging economy is lower than the cor-
responding one when the non-negativity constraint for the investor’s consumption of the
current period is not binding.
Whenever $′ > 0 the future period’s non-negativity constraint in consumption is bind-
ing. As a consequence the investors invest (in both riskless and risky bonds) more than the
“optimal” amount.
The specific expression for the emerging economy’s bond prices is:
q =
[
q∗ +
βLCov [$′, d′]
vcL(cL)
+
βLE [$′] (1− δ)
vcL(cL)
]
.
The term βLCov[$
′,d′]
v
cL(cL)
is negative: lower levels of d′ imply lower levels of cL′ and a
more binding non-negative constraint. The term βLE[$
′](1−δ)
v
cL(cL)
is positive. Therefore two
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opposing forces are at work related to the non-negativity constraint: first, more riskiness
of the emerging economy’s bonds implies a higher likelihood that the investment in the
emerging economy will not pay back (lower future consumption via this effect); second,
more riskiness implies a larger risk premium and therefore higher earnings if the investment
pays back (higher future consumption via this effect).
Given the two opposing effects, the net effect on the emerging economy’s bond prices is
not clear: it might be that the observed bond price is somewhat larger than it would be if
the non-negativity constraint was not binding.
Investor’s Credit Constraints Whenever the representative investor faces credit con-
straints in international credit markets the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions characterize
her optimization problem:
For θTB′
qfvcL
(
cL
)− µ = βLE [vcL (cL′)] .
For θ′j
q = q∗ − µ (1− δ)
vcL (cL)
.
where, as before, q∗ corresponds to the bond price consistent with and interior solution for
representative investor’s optimization problem, and µ corresponds to the multiplier on the
representative investor’s credit constraint.
Given that credit constraints for the investors would increase their opportunity cost
of investing in emerging economies, other things given, these constraints should reduce
the equilibrium bond prices of the emerging economy even further in comparison with the
default risk adjusted- price (i.e., qRN ).
2.2 The Emerging Economy
The representative agent of the emerging economy maximizes her discounted expected life-
time utility from consumption
max
{ct}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct) (11)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and c is the emerging economy’s consumption at
time t. The emerging economy’s periodic utility takes the functional form
u(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ
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where γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In each period, the economy receives a stochastic stream of consumption goods, y.
This endowment is non-storable; realizations of the endowment are assumed to have a
compact support; and the endowment follows a Markov process drawn from probability
space (y, Y (y)) with a transition function f(y′ | y).
In each period, based on the stochastic endowment, y, the economy decides how much
to consume, c. The economy can consume c > y by trading one period non-contingent
discount bonds b′ at a price, q, with international investors.
As a consequence of commitment problems, the price of the emerging economy’s bond
might be different depending on whether the economy is saving or borrowing. If b′ ≥ 0,
there is not commitment problem in the side of the economy and there is no risk of default
on such a bond. In this case, the emerging economy’s bond is identical to the bonds issued
by industrialized markets; therefore in equilibrium the bond price of a emerging economy
with no default risk is the same as the bond price of industrialized countries. Consequently,
the price of a bond with a positive face value is equal to the price of a T-Bill, so q = qf .
If b′ < 0, the emerging country is borrowing. In this case, because emerging economies
cannot bind themselves to honor their debts, the emerging country might default next
period. At one extreme, there might be values of b′ < 0 for some given state of the world,
s, such that the representative agent of the economy never finds it optimal to default. In
this case the bonds issued by the emerging economy do not involve any default risk, and
therefore q = qf . At the other extreme, for the same state of the world, s, there might
be values of b′ < 0 such that once the debt is due the economy would not choose to repay
in any state of the world next period, s′. In this case q = 0. In the intermediate case, for
the same state of the world, s, some other values of b′ < 0 might imply that the emerging
economy will find it optimal to default on her debts in some states of the world next period
s′. In this case, in order to induce international investors to buy the emerging economy’s
bonds, the price of such bonds needs to be lower than the price of a T-Bill, q < qf .
As consequence, the price of the emerging economy’s bonds is a function not only of the
state of the world, s, but also of b′.
The resource constraint of the emerging economy is given by
c = y − (1− d)φ+ d (b− qb′) , (12)
where d, which has been defined in the investor’s section, describes the state of the economy
with respect to participation in international financial markets. If d = 1, the economy is not
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in a state of default. If d = 0 the emerging economy is in a state of default (either because
she has defaulted on her debts in a previous period and has not regained access to financial
markets or because she is defaulting on her debts in the current period) and the country is
currently in financial autarky. Once a country defaults, that country is excluded from access
to the credit market, and that country remains in a state of default for a random number
of periods. During the periods of exclusion of financial markets the country is not able to
smooth its consumption, and it is limited to consume its stochastic endowment minus some
amount given by a function φ that defines the direct loss in terms of endowment that the
country faces during the periods of exclusion from credit markets.
Under this framework, the optimization problem of the emerging country can be repre-
sented recursively by the following Bellman equation
V (s) = max
{
V C(s), V D(s)
}
(13)
and
V C(s) = max
c,b′
u (c) + βEV
(
s′ | s)
s.t. c = y + b− qb′
(14)
where V C(s) is the value to the economy of not defaulting and V D(s) is the value of
defaulting in the current period.
Definition 2 The value for the emerging economy of default is given by
V D(s) = u(y − φ) + βE[τV C(s′ | s) + (1− τ)V D(s′ | s)].
τ is the exogenous probability that the emerging economy would re-enter credit markets in
the current period given that this economy has defaulted in her debts in a previous period.
For the emerging country the decision of default/repayment depends on the comparison
between the value of continuing in the credit contract, V C(s) , versus the value of opting of
financial autarky, V D(s). The decision of current default/repayment takes the functional
form
d =
{
1 if V C(s) > V D(s)
0 otherwise
}
(15)
Conditional on the representative investor’s wealth level, the emerging economy’s default
policy can be characterized by default sets:
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Definition 3 For a given level of wealth, W , the default set D (b |W ) consists of the equi-
librium set of y for which default is optimal when the emerging economy’s asset holdings
are b:
D ( b |W ) =
{
y ∈ Y : V C (b, y) ≤ V D (y) | W
}
. (16)
Equilibrium default sets, D (b′ |W ′ (s)), are related to equilibrium default probabilities,
δ (b′, y′ | s), by the equation
δ
(
b′, y′ | s) = 1− Ed′ (b′, y′ | s) = ∫
D(b′|W ′(s))
f
(
y′ | y) dy′. (17)
If the default set is empty for b′, then for all realizations of the economy’s endowment,
d′ = 1 and the equilibrium default probability δ (b′, y′ | s) is equal to 0. In this case, it is not
optimal for the economy to default in the next period for any realization of its endowment,
and Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′
]
= 0 and q = qf . On the other hand, if the default set includes the
entire support for the endowment realizations, i.e. D (b′ |W ′ (s)) = Y , then d′ = 0 for
all realizations of the economy’s endowment. As a consequence, the equilibrium default
probability δ (b′, y′ | s) is equal to 1, and Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′
]
= 0, so q = 0.
Otherwise, when the default set is not empty but does not include the whole support for
the endowment realizations, 0 < δ (b′, y′ | s) < 1. In this case, which was analyzed in the
section describing the investors’ optimization problem, Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′
]
> 0, so q < qf .
Equations (10),(13),(15),(16) and (17) make clear that for the case of an economy that
cannot commit to repayment, when there exist levels of b′ in which the emerging economy
finds it optimal to default in some states of the world, then the price of bonds depends not
only on the emerging economy’s fundamentals, but on the representative investor’s level
of wealth and risk aversion. This case is very different from the case of an identical small
open economy that faces risk neutral investors in international financial markets. As can
be seen in other models of the sovereign debt literature when investors are risk neutral,
the price of bonds of the economy depends only on the economy’s own fundamentals and
characteristics.
3 Characterization of the Equilibrium
The recursive equilibrium for this model is defined as a set of policy functions for (i) the
emerging economy’s consumption c(s), (ii) the emerging economy’s asset holdings b′(s),
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(iii)the emerging economy’s default decisions d(s) and the associated default sets D (b|W ),
(iv) the representative investor’s consumption cL(s), (v) the representative investor’s hold-
ings of emerging economy’s bonds θ′(s), (vi) the representative investor’s holdings of T-Bills
θTB
′(s), and (vii) the emerging economy’s bond price function q(s, b′) such that:
(i) Taking as given the representative investor’s policies, and the bond price function
q(s, b′), the emerging economy’s consumption c(s) satisfies the economy’s resource
constraint. Additionally, the economy’s policy functions b′(s), d(s) and default sets
D (b|W ) satisfy the optimization problem of this emerging economy.
(ii) Taking as given the emerging economy’s policies, and the bond price function q(s, b′)
the representative investor’s consumption cL(s) satisfies the investor’s budget con-
straint. Also, the representative investor’s policy functions θ′(s) and θTB ′(s) satisfy
the optimization problem of the representative investor, and the law of motion of the
investor’s wealth.
(iii) Bond prices reflect the emerging economies probability of default and the risk premium
demanded by the representative international investor, and these prices clear the
market for the emerging economy’s bonds:
b ′(s) = −θ ′(s) if b ′(s) < 0 (18a)
0 = −θ ′(s) if b ′(s) ≥ 0. (18b)
This condition implies that the representative investor and the representative agent
of the emerging economy agree on a financial contract (b′, q) that is optimal for both
agents.
3.1 Characterization of Default Sets
The characterization of default sets is the characterization of incentives to default and
therefore the characterization of endogenous default risk. In this model, default risk is a
function of both the emerging economy’s fundamentals—the economy’s endowment process
and its asset position—and the characteristics of the international investor—the investor’s
risk aversion and wealth.
Maximum Credit Constraint and Maximum Safe Level of Debt In order to
continue with the characterization of the default sets it is necessary to define two concepts,
the maximum credit constraint and the maximum safe level of debt. The maximum credit
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constraint is the maximum level of assets, b(W ), that is low enough such that no matter what
the realization of the endowment, default is the optimal choice and D(b(W ) |W ) = Y . On
the other hand, themaximum safe level of debt is the minimum level of assets b(W ) for which
staying in the contract is the optimal choice for all realizations of the endowment. In this
case, D(b(W ) | W ) = ∅. Finally, because the value of the credit contract is monotonically
decreasing in b, it is obvious that
b(W ) ≤b(W ) ≤ 0 .
Proposition 1 For any state of the world, s, the maximum credit constraint, b(W ), and
the maximum safe level of debt, b(W ), are singled-valued functions.
Proof. To define these concepts, note that the stochastic process for the endowments
has a compact support. Also note that, conditional onW , the value of the credit contract is
monotonically decreasing in b. Monotonicity of the credit contract and compactness of the
endowment support are sufficient conditions to guarantee that given the state of the world,
these critical values (i.e. maximum credit constraint and maximum safe level of debt) are
single-valued functions.
From the previous discussion it is clear that given some current level of investors’ wealth,
any investment in the emerging economy’s bonds in excess of b(W ) would imply a probability
of default equal to 1. These investments will have a price of 0. On the other hand, all
investments in the emerging economy’s bond of an amount lower than b(W ) imply a zero
probability of default. These investments will have a price of qf .
Default Sets and Risk Aversion of International Investors The degree of investors’
risk aversion is an important determinant of access of emerging economies to credit markets,
and of the risk of default of the economy. In this model, the more risk averse are international
investors, the higher is the default risk and the tighter is the endogenous credit constraint
faced by all emerging economies.
Proposition 2 For any state of the world, s, as the risk aversion of the international
investor increases, the emerging economy’s incentives to default increase.
Proof. See Appendix.
The economic intuition behind this result is straightforward for the case of permanent
exclusion from credit markets following a default. In this case, for the emerging economy,
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while the value of autarky is not a function of the investor’s risk aversion, the value of
maintaining access to credit markets is decreasing in the investor’s degree of risk aversion.
In order to induce a very risk averse investor to hold sovereign bonds, the emerging economy
has to forgo much more current consumption—i.e. has to accept a very low price for her
bonds. However, other things equal, with lower bond prices, incentives to default are
stronger. Therefore for any given state of the world, s, the degree of risk in the economy is
increasing in the degree of risk aversion of international investors.
When the exclusion from credit markets following default is not permanent, both the
value of financial autarky and the value of maintaining access to credit markets are functions
of the investor’s risk aversion. The value of autarky in the current period includes the value
of maintaining access to the credit markets in future periods once the economy is admitted
back to the credit markets; therefore is also decreasing in the investor’s degree of risk
aversion. However the value of maintaining access to credit markets in future periods is
weighted by the probability of coming back (which is lower than 1) and the discount rate
(which is also lower than 1). As a consequence, the response of the value of autarky in the
current period to the risk aversion of international investors is smaller than the response of
the value of maintaining access to credit markets in the current period to the risk aversion
of these investors. Therefore, the degree of risk in the economy is increasing in the degree
of risk aversion of international investors, as in the case of permanent punishment after a
default.
As the degree of risk in the economy changes, so too will the capital flows to the economy:
For γ1L < γ
2
L, Proposition 2 implies that
D
(
b |W ; γ1L
) ⊆ D (b |W ; γ2L) .
Therefore, it must hold that
b
(
W ; γ2L
) ≥ b ( W ; γ1L) .
b
(
W ; γ2L
) ≥ b ( W ; γ1L) .
This equation shows that maximum credit constraints b (W ) for the emerging economy are
tighter the more risk averse are international investors—some contracts that are feasible
under less risk averse investors are not feasible under more risk averse investors.
The result in Proposition 2 is consistent with empirical findings which characterize the
role of investor’s risk aversion in the determination of country risk and sovereign yield.19
19Much empirical evidence supports Proposition 2: Using the spread between the yield of three month
T-bills and the US federal funds rate as a proxy for market turbulence, Arora and Cerisola (2001) find that
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Default Sets and Investor’s Wealth In the present model, the economic performance
of the emerging economy cannot be explained by the fundamentals of the emerging economy
alone, i.e. by the economy’s asset position and stochastic process of the endowment. The
investor’s wealth also affects the emerging economy’s performance. This result is formalized
in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Default sets are shrinking in assets of the representative investor. For all
W1 < W2, if default is optimal for b in some states y, given W2, then default will be optimal
for b for the same states y, given W1. Therefore D (b |W2) ⊆ D (b |W1)
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is simple: given some default risk, it is less costly (in
terms of current utility) for the investor to invest in the emerging economy when she is
wealthy than when she is poor. So keeping constant the degree of risk that the investor
faces, any investment that she is willing to undertake when she is poor she will also be willing
to undertake when she is rich. Intuitively, financial contracts available to the representative
agent of the emerging economy when the investor is relatively rich have to be at least as good
as the feasible contracts to which the economy has access when the investor is relatively
poor. Additionally, the previous effect implies that the emerging economy faces stronger
incentives to default when the wealth of the investor is relatively low. Therefore default
risk is decreasing in the wealth of the investor. These two effects amplify and reinforce each
other.
Proposition 3 implies that for W1 < W2 it must hold
b ( W 1) ≥ b ( W 2)
b ( W 1) ≥ b ( W 2)
and therefore the maximum credit limit that the emerging economy faces is tighter for lower
levels of wealth of the investor (b (W1) ≥ b (W2)).
heightened macroeconomic uncertainty in the US, has a positive significant effect on sovereign credit spreads
for emerging markets. Using high-low yield spreads on US corporate bonds as a proxy for risk aversion of US
investors, Ferruci et al.(2004) and FitzGerald and Krolzig (2003) find that sovereign bond spreads increase
when the risk aversion of US investors increases. Similarly, Cunningham et al. (2001), Westphalen (2001),
and Kamin and von Kleist (1999) find evidence that the risk premium in sovereign bonds increases more
than proportionally when default risk increases. Finally, Mody and Taylor (2004), Ferruci et al.(2004), and
FitzGerald and Krolzig (2003) find that risk aversion of US investors is an important determinant of capital
flows to emerging economies: a higher US high-low yield spread—interpreted as a reduction in investor risk
appetite—results in a reduced supply of capital to emerging economies.
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This result is a consequence of the fact that for investors, the marginal cost of invest-
ing in sovereign bonds in terms of current consumption is decreasing in investors’ wealth.
Given that investors are risk averse with decreasing absolute risk aversion, investing in the
sovereign bonds when their wealth is low is too costly; so when the wealth of the investor
falls, the resources available to the emerging economy become scarce, reducing the value
for the emerging economy of participating in credit markets. In turn, because the sovereign
country has increasing incentives to default, some loans or portfolio investments that are
feasible when the investor is wealthy cannot be an equilibrium outcome when the investor
is poor.
Findings of several empirical papers on the literature regarding the determinants of
capital flows and sovereign bonds spreads of emerging economies are consistent with the
results in Proposition 3. See, for example, Warther (1995), Westphalen (2001), FitzGerald
and Krolzig (2003), Mody and Taylor (2004), and Ferruci et al.(2004).
The results in Proposition 3 are also consistent with the evidence regarding financial
contagion across countries who share investors. See for example Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Hernandez and Valdes (2001) andVan Rijckeghem
and Weder (2001).20
Default Sets and the Asset Position of the Emerging Economy In the model, a
highly indebted economy is more likely to default than an economy with lower debt. And
as in models of the same type where investors are risk neutral, default sets are shrinking in
assets.
Proposition 4 Default sets are shrinking in assets of the emerging economy. For all b1 <
b2, if default is optimal for b2 in some states y, given W , then default will be optimal for
b1 for the same states y, given W . Therefore D (b2 |W ) ⊆ D (b1 |W ).
20For the period 1984 to 1993, Warther (1995) finds that an inflow to corporate bond funds of around
1% of the mutual fund’s assets results in a permanent increase of 2.1% in those bond prices (i.e. reduces
the cost of borrowing for those issuing those bonds). Using world and U.S. equity indexes respectively as
proxies for the business climate (an increase in these indexes is associated with a better business climate),
Westphalen (2001) and Ferruci et al. (2004) find a negative relation between economic expansion in the
investors’ countries and sovereign yield spreads of emerging economies. FitzGerald and Krolzig (2003) find a
positive and significant relationship between US output and capital inflows to emerging economies. Finally,
Mody and Taylor (2003) find that a higher growth in industrial production in the US has a positive effect
on the supply of capital to emerging economies.
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This result is analogous to the result in Arellano (2008), and closely related to the results
in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Chatterjee, et al. (2002). The main difference in the
present paper is that the result is conditioned on the level of wealth of the representative
investor.
The economic intuition is simple for the case in which the punishment for defaulting is
permanent exclusion from credit markets: While the value for the economy of fulfilling the
contract is increasing in b, the outside value of the economy is not—the value of financial
autarky does not depend on b. Therefore as the indebtedness of the economy increases,
the value of the contract decreases, while the value of default remains unchanged. As a
consequence, starting from an asset position b in which default is the optimal choice, it
is clear that if the assets shrink, the value of the contract also falls. As the value of the
contract falls, default will continue to be the optimal choice.
The quantitative analysis of the model suggests that this result also holds in the more
general case in which exclusion from credit markets is temporary.
Default Sets and Capital Inflows The emerging economy only defaults when it is
facing capital outflows. In this case, d (s) = 0 implies that for all the financial contracts
available to the economy, b− q (s; b′ (s)) b′ (s) < 0.
Intuitively, whenever the emerging economy decides to default, the value of default
must be at least as good as the value of the optimal financial contract available to this
country
(
V C(s) ≤ V D(s)). However if any available financial contracts allows for capital
inflows to the emerging economy, then by choosing that contract the economy not only
can consume more in the current period than under default (c ≥ y − φ), but in the next
period the economy is guaranteed at least the same level of satisfaction as under default
(because the economy has the option of defaulting in the next period). Therefore for any
state of the world s, whenever there are financial contracts {q (s; b′ (s)) , b′ (s)} such that
b− q (s; b′ (s)) b′ (s) > 0, default is not an optimal decision.
Default Sets and Endowment Realization Default sets also depend on the realization
of income. As in Arellano (2008), it is possible to show analytically that for the case of
permanent exclusion of the emerging economy from credit markets after defaulting, if the
endowment process is i.i.d. for given W , then default incentives are stronger for lower levels
of income.
The numerical solution of the present model extends this result to the more general
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case in which the exclusion of the emerging economy from credit markets after defaulting is
not permanent and the stochastic process of her endowments follows a Markov chain with
persistence.
Proposition 5 If the endowment process is i.i.d., default incentives are stronger the lower
the endowment. For all y1 < y2, if y2 ∈ D (b |W ) then y1 ∈ D (b |W ) .
The intuition for this result follows Arellano (2008). Again, the main difference is that
in the present context, the result is conditioned on the level of wealth of the investors.
The logic behind this results follows from the fact that default is only optimal if under all
feasible financial contracts the emerging economy experiences capital outflows. In the case
of a recession, capital outflows are extremely costly in terms of the welfare of a risk averse
agent (because the concavity of the periodic utility); therefore at sufficiently low levels of
the endowment realization, the credit market becomes a less effective tool for consumption
smoothing than default.
This result is also consistent with the empirical literature on the determination of credit
ratings and sovereign yields. In this literature, sovereign yield spreads increase when the
economy’s fundamentals deteriorate, mainly when output falls.
Additionally, this result implies that because default risk is counter-cyclical, domestic
interest rates are also counter-cyclical. Counter-cyclicality is consistent with the stylized
facts of financial emerging markets (see Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and Uribe and Yue
(2006)).
3.2 Default as an equilibrium outcome of the model and Investors char-
acteristics
In the current model to observe default at equilibrium it must hold that beginning from an
asset position b such that D (b |W ) = ∅, there exists a sequence of endowment shocks such
that this economy ends up borrowing b′ and D (b′ |W ′ (s)) 6= ∅.
From the definitions of the maximum credit constraint b(W ′) and the maximum safe
level of debt b(W ′), it is clear that any b′ for which D (b′ |W ′ (s)) 6= ∅ satisfies b′ ∈
(b(W ′), b(W ′)). A necessary condition for the economy to optimally choose to borrow b′
instead the maximum safe level of debt b (W ′ (s)) is that by doing so the economy is able to
increase its current consumption. If by borrowing b′ instead of b (W ′ (s)) the economy does
not increases its current consumption then b′ is not optimal: not only does the economy not
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achieve a higher level of consumption this period by choosing b′, but the debt obligations
pending for next period are larger than if the economy had borrowed b (W ′ (s)) instead.
In order to establish if default might be an equilibrium outcome of the model, it is
necessary to determine if there exists some b′ < b (W ′ (s)) for which by increasing its
borrowing beyond the maximum safe level of debt the economy is able to increase its
current capital inflows −q(s, b′)b′.
Following closely the analysis in Arellano (2008) and focusing on the case in which
incentives to default are stronger the lower the endowment, it is possible to define the
conditional default boundary function y∗(b|W ) as follows:21
Definition 4 The conditional default boundary function y∗(b|W ) corresponds to the endow-
ment level y∗ for a given level of debt b ∈ (b(W ), b(W )) conditional on the representative
investor’s assets W which makes the value of repayment and the value of default equal for
the emerging economy: V C(b, y∗,W ) = V D(y∗,W ).
Conditional on the investor’s wealthW , y∗(b|W ) divides the space {y, b} into the default
and repayment regions. As a consequence of proposition 4, the conditional default boundary
is decreasing in the emerging economy’s assets. Furthermore, as result of proposition 3
the conditional default boundary is also decreasing on the investor’s assets. Finally, due to
proposition 2 this function is increasing in the investor’s risk aversion.
Using the definition of bond prices in equation (10), together with the definition of
default probabilities in equation (17), it is possible to show that as in the case of risk
neutral investors, the equilibrium bond price, q(s, b′), is a function of the default boundary,
y∗(b′|W ′ (s)), and the distribution of shocks.
However, for the case of risk averse investors both the investors’ risk aversion γL and their
wealth level W affect the bond prices: besides helping to determine the default boundary
y∗(b′|W ′ (s)), γL and W also help to determine the excess risk premium included in the
21The case in which incentives to default for the emerging economy are stronger when endowments are
low seems to be the empirically relevant case as long as the persistence of the endowment shocks is not too
high.
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equilibrium bond prices:
q(s, b′) = qf [1− F (y∗(b′|W ′ (s)))] + βL
[
Cov(vcL(cL
′
(s)), d′ (s))
]
vcL(cL (s))
=
Y∫
y∗(b′|W ′(s))
βL
vcL
(
cL
′
(s)
)
vcL (cL (s))
f
(
y′ | y) dy′.
where F is the cumulative probability distribution of shocks.
Financial contracts {q(s, b′(s)), b′(s)} observed at equilibrium change current consump-
tion by the product −q(s, b′(s))b′(s). As consequence of the result in proposition 4, the
definition of the conditional boundary function, and the definition of equilibrium bond
prices, as debt increases the equilibrium bond prices go to zero. Therefore it is possible to
define the endogenous borrowing limit b∗(s) as follows:
Definition 5 The endogenous borrowing limit b∗(s) is the level of debt for which pi ≡
−q(s, b∗(s))b∗(s) is such that
pi = max
b′
[
−
(
qf [1− F (y∗(b′|W ′))] + βL[Cov(vcL(c
L′), d′)]
vcL(cL)
)
b′
]
.
For any given state s, b∗(s) is the endogenous borrowing constraint since for any b′ < b∗(s)
V C(s, b′) < V C(s, b∗(s)), and therefore b′ < b∗(s) cannot be optimal.
As for the case of risk neutral investors, for any state s the relevant risky region of the
model is limited to contracts with b′ ∈ [b∗ (s) , b(W ′)).
Proposition 6 A necessary condition to observe default at equilibrium is that for some
state s the relevant risky region of the model is not empty. In other words, default is a
possible outcome of the time series of the model only if there exists some b∗ (s) such that
b∗ (s) < b(W ′).
In order to observe default at equilibrium the equilibrium price function cannot decrease
“too fast” when assets decrease.
Given the speed at which bond prices decrease when the economy’s assets decrease,
the smaller is b (W ′ (s)), the higher is the chance that there exists b∗ (s) < b (W ′ (s)).
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Intuitively, because investors must be compensated in order to induce them to take some
default risk, this risk imposes an additional cost of borrowing for the emerging economy.
For the borrower, the cost of borrowing beyond the maximum safe level must be paid
over the total amount of resources borrowed, and not only over the marginal amount of
borrowing. Therefore, the larger is the base over which this additional cost of borrowing
has to be paid—i.e. the larger is the maximum safe level of borrowing—the higher is the
cost of default risk and the lower is the likelihood that the economy would ever choose to
borrow beyond the safe level of debt.
Role ofW in the determination of the existence of b∗ (s) < b(W ′ (s)). First, because
of Proposition 3 a higher level of investors’ wealth allows the emerging economy to borrow
more. This effect implies that when investors are wealthier, other things equal, default risk
imposes a larger additional cost of borrowing beyond the safe level of debt. In this case, any
change in q (s, b′) will be felt over a larger base of borrowing. As a result, for the emerging
economy there is potentially less to gain from accepting a lower price for these bonds in
order to further increase borrowing. This effect makes it more difficult for the economy to
increase consumption by risking default. Consequently, this effect implies that it should
be easier to observe default as an equilibrium outcome when international investors are
relatively constrained financially compared to when investors are relatively solvent.
Second, a higher level of investors’ wealth reduces the absolute risk aversion of these
agents. As a consequence, because the investors demand a relatively small excess risk
premium, sovereign bond prices change “more slowly”.
These two effects effect default probability in opposite directions. Therefore, is not pos-
sible to establish analytically how the equilibrium default probability of the model responds
to changes in the wealth level of the investors. The numerical simulations of the model
performed here suggest that this effect can go either way.
Role of γL in the determination of the existence of b∗ (s) < b(W ′ (s)). First, Propo-
sition 2 establishes that the more risk averse investors are, the less the economy is able to
borrow and the lower is the maximum safe level of borrowing for any given state of the
world. Therefore, other things equal, if investors are very risk averse, the cost of a change
in the price of the bonds is felt over a smaller borrowing base. In this case, there is poten-
tially more to gain from accepting a lower price for these bonds in order to further increase
borrowing. Therefore this effect makes default a more likely outcome of the model.
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Table 1: Business Cycle for Argentina and International Investors
std(x) corr(x,output) corr(x,sp 500) corr(x,spread)
Interest Rate Spread 5.42 -0.60 -0.39
Trade Balance 1.83 -0.59 -0.07 0.38
Consumption 1.94 0.93 0.35 -0.78
Output 1.91 0.15
Consumption USA 0.31 -0.08 0.40 -0.08
Output USA 0.40 0.50 -0.10
SP500 14.79 0.15
Dow 11.22 0.11 0.94 -0.30
Second, larger risk aversion of investors also implies a larger response of q (s, b′) to
changes in the borrowing level. Other things equal, the more risk averse investors are, the
larger is the excess risk premium that they demand in order to take default risk.
Again these two effects go in opposite directions. Therefore, is not possible to establish
analytically how the equilibrium default probability of the model responds to changes in
the investor’s risk aversion. The numerical simulations of the model performed here also
suggest that this effect can go either way.
4 Quantitative Analysis
Following the recent literature on endogenous sovereign default risk, the model in this
paper is used to study the case of Argentina and its default at the end of 2001. The idea
is to compare the quantitative performance of the model of endogenous sovereign risk with
risk averse investors to the performance of the model of endogenous sovereign risk with
risk neutral investors. The model is solved numerically at a quarterly frequency and its
parameters are chosen to replicate important features of the Argentinean economy and the
international investors in emerging economies for the period 1983:Q1-2001:Q4. In order to
draw clear implications of what considering risk aversion can add to the existing literature on
the dynamics of emerging economies, some parameters are not calibrated to match specific
targets in the data, but instead are taken from the previous literature on the subject of
endogenous sovereign risk that looks at the Argentinean default.
Table 1 describes the relevant business cycle features for the period under study. For
the Argentinean output, consumption and trade balance, and for the U.S. output and
consumption the source of the data is the IFS; for the yield of 3-months U.S. Treasury Bills
the source is the Federal Reserve Board; for the SP500 index and the Dow-Jones Industrial
Average index the source is Bloomberg; finally for the interest rate of Argentina the source
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Table 2: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
Emerging Economy’s Mean Income E [y] 1
Std. Dev. Emerging Economy’s Income std [y] 0.025
Autocorr. Emerging Economy’s Income Process 0.945
Emerging Economy’s Mean Income E [y] 1
Emerging Economy’s Discount Factor β 0.953
Emerging Economy’s Risk Aversion γ 2
Probability of re-entry τ 0.282
Critical level of output for asymmetrical output cost yˆ = 0.969E(y)
Representative investor’s Income X 0.01
Representative Investor’s Discount Factor βL 0.98
Representative investor’s Risk Aversion γL 2
Risk Free Interest Rate rf = 1
qf
0.017
is Neumeyer and Perri (2005). The data for the business cycle statistics includes the period
1983:Q1-2001:Q4 for all series except for Argentina’s private consumption. For Argentina’s
private consumption data is only available from 1993:Q1 on. Therefore for this variable the
business cycle statistics corresponds to the period from the initial moment in which it is
available to first quarter of 2008. Output and consumption for Argentina and the U.S., and
the sp500, and the Dow-Jones indexes are seasonally adjusted and in logs and filtered with
the H-P filter. The Argentinean trade balance is reported as a percentage of the output.
The interest spread is defined as the difference between the Argentinean interest rate and
the yield of a 3 month U.S. T-Bill.
As has been documented in the previous literature on the subject of default risk, interest
rate spreads are negatively correlated with the Argentinean output and consumption. The
model in this paper matches this correlation; additionally, if we consider that investor’s
wealth can be proxy by either the U.S. output, the Dow-Jones index or the SP500 index,
the model is consistent with the observed correlation between spreads and international
investors wealth. 22.
4.1 Calibration
Table 2 gives the parameters which are considered in the numerical analysis of the model. As
previously stated, to make the comparison straightforward between the results of this model
and the model of endogenous sovereign risk with risk neutral investors, the parameters for
22The Dow-Jones index is a price-weighted index of 30 blue-chip stocks from U.S. firms that are generally
leaders in the industry. The SP500 index is a capitalization-weighted index of 500 stocks that represent all
industries that is designed to measure performance of the broad economy.
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the emerging economy are taken from the calibration in Arellano (2008): the mean income
of the emerging economy is normalized to 1. The coefficient of risk aversion of the economy
is 2, a standard value considered in the business cycle literature. The free interest rate is
set to 1.7%, to match the period under study with the quarterly US interest rate of a bond
with a maturity of 5 years. The GDP is assumed to follow a log-normal AR(1) process
log(yt) = ρlog(yt−1) + εy with E[εy] = 0 and E[εy2] = σ2y .
The values estimated by Arellano(2008) for the Argentinean economy are ρ = 0.94 and
σy = 0.025, and the shock is discretized into a 21 state Markov chain using the quadrature
based procedure (Hussey and Tauchen (1991)). Following a default there is an asymmetrical
function for the output loss that follows:
φ(y) =
{
ŷ if y > ŷ
y if y ≤ ŷ
}
(19)
with ŷ = 0.969E(y), which in the model with risk neutral investors targets a value of 5.53%
for the average debt service to GDP ratio.
The probability of re-entry to credit markets after defaulting is set at 0.282, which
is consistent with the empirical evidence regarding the exclusion from credit markets of
defaulting countries (see Gelos et al. (2002)). The model with risk neutral investors targets
a volatility of 1.75 for the trade balance. The discount factor is set a 0.953 which in the
model with risk neutral investors targets a annual default probability of 3%.
The parameters for the international investors are set as follows: the representative
investor’s discount factor is set to 0.98. If there were no uncertainty, the discount factor
of the investors would pin-down the international risk free interest rate (i.e., β
L
qf
= 1 );
however with uncertainty, in order to have a well defined distribution for the investor’s
assets, it is necessary to have a value of the discount factor such that β
L
qf
< 1. The value
of βL = 0.98 is the highest value in the range commonly used in business cycle studies of
industrialized countries such that the asset distribution of the investors is well defined given
an international interest rate of 1.7%. The value of βL can be lowered to help the model to
generate larger sovereign spreads but at the cost of much more volatility in these spreads.
The representative investor’s coefficient of risk aversion is set at 2; the criteria to choose
this parameter is to generate a mean spread for model that is as close as possible to the
mean spread in Argentina for the period of study, which corresponds to 12.67%. Previous
numerical analysis of the model seem to suggest a non-monotonic relation between sovereign
spreads and the risk aversion parameter of the investors γL: for low values of risk aversion
(i.e, γL ≤ 2) the mean of the simulated sovereign spreads grow with γL, while for higher
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values of γL the response of the prices to changes in debt levels is so strong that almost no
default is observed at equilibrium.
The representative investor receives a deterministic income of X = 1% of the emerg-
ing economy’s mean income in each period. This parameter is set to minimize the joint
deviations between the observed long term excess return of the portfolio of an investor in
sovereign debt markets and the observed sharpe-ratio of such a portfolio. According to Jos-
tova (2006), if the investment strategy followed by the investor in sovereign debt markets is
an active investment strategy (the adjustment in the shares allocated to risky and riskless
investments is done based on short term shocks), the annual average sharpe-ratio and the
annual average excess return are 0.63 and 19.5%.
The parameter X affects the long term excess return of the portfolio of the investor
and the volatility of those returns through its effect on the extent to which the investor is
able to borrow from international credit markets. Small values of X imply less possibility
of risk free borrowing by investors, and therefore more difficulty for them in smoothing
their consumption. As a consequence, investors receive large compensations for making
risky investments, and obtain a large excess return on their portfolio. Comparatively,
however, the volatility of such a portfolio is even larger. This relatively high volatility of the
portfolio translates into small sharpe-ratio for the investors’ portfolio. In the data, however,
we observe relatively large excess returns and large sharpe-ratios in the portfolio of the
investors in sovereign debt markets. In the model there is a tradeoff between excess returns
and sharpe-ratios: Low values of X (lower than the one chosen in here) can generate larger
excess returns but predict very low sharpe-ratios for the investor’s portfolio in comparison
to the values observed in the data. On the other hand, high values of X (larger than the
considered in here) can match the sharpe-ratio for the investor’s portfolio but underestimate
the average long term excess return of such portfolio. The numerical simulations of the
model in here imply an annual average sharpe-ration and annual excess return of 0.05 and
18.0%.
4.2 Simulations
The business cycles statistics of the model are derived as follows: The model is simulated
for 20, 000 periods. From these 20, 000 periods, sub-samples that have economy A staying
in the credit market for 74 periods before going into a default are taken to compute the
business cycles statistics of the two economies. This process is repeated 5, 000 times, and
the cycle statistics are the average of the statistics derived from each of these repetitions.
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Table 3: Business Cycle Statistic: The Model and the Data.
Statistics Data RA RA-4 RA-D RN RN-4 RN-D
mean (r − rf ) 12.67% 5.52% 7.99% 9.69% 4.65% 6.68% 7.22%
std (r − rf ) 5.42% 3.56% 4.54% 4.35% 2.41% 3.59% 3.70%
mean (−(b/y)) 53.30% 5.19% 4.04% 3.35% 5.92% 3.26% 2.55%
std (c)/ std(y) 1.02 1.18 1.18 1.40 1.26 1.25 1.47
std (tb/y) 1.83% 1.03% 1.17% 1.03% 1.48% 1.32% 1.08%
corr (y, c) 0.93 0.96 0.61 - 0.94 0.59 -
corr (y, r − rf ) -0.60 -0.38 -0.49 - -0.42 -0.41 -
corr (tb/y, y) -0.59 -0.48 -0.16 - -0.43 -0.19 -
corr (W , c) 0.35 0.01 0.19 - 0.00 0.00 -
corr (W , r − rf ) -0.39 -0.05 -0.11 - 0.00 0.00 -
Default Probability 0.74% 1.06% - - 1.36% - -
The results of the simulations are shown in Table 3. The label RA (RN) refers to the
results of the simulations with risk averse investors (risk averse investors);RA− 4 (RN − 4)
refers to the results of the simulations for the four periods previous to the default episode;
RA − D (RN − D) refers to the results of the simulations for the period previous to the
default episode.
The simulations presented here show that considering risk averse investors instead of
risk neutral investors provides a better match to the risk premium of sovereign bond prices
and its volatility as well as to the level of borrowing by emerging economies. Because the
risk premium in the asset prices has to be large enough to compensate the investor not
only for the probability of default, but also for taking the risk of default, other things equal
the model simulated here is able to account for a larger proportion of credit spreads than
models with a representative risk neutral investor.
In the data the mean interest rate spread is 12.67%. According to the model here, for
the whole period the mean interest rate spread is 5.52%. This value is 1% larger than the
spread of the model with risk neutral investors. Also, for the period before default the
spread rises to 9.69%. This value is 2.5% larger than the value predicted by the model with
risk neutral investors. Additionally, the volatility of the spread in the data is 5.42%; in the
risk averse model this volatility is 3.56%; while the volatility predicted by the model with
risk neutral investors is 2.41%.
It is important to note that this mean spread corresponds to the average for those
periods in which the economy is in a repayment state, that is, when the economy is not
excluded from financial markets. If the average over all periods is considered, the model
generates spreads of 12.37%, while for the model with risk neutral investors this average is
10.25%.
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In the data, the mean debt-to-output ratio is around 53.3%. While this debt-to-output
ratio is largely under-predicted by the model, the alternative model does not do a better
job in this dimension, and under-predicts this ratio even more for the year previous to the
default episode.
The model introduced here also reproduces the counter-cyclical behavior of domestic
interest rates. The value of the correlation predicted by both models is lower than the
observed value for the data of −0.60. The numerical solution of the model shows that the
correlation between domestic interest rates and output is around −0.38 for the whole period
and −0.49 for the year before the default episode. The alternative model (i.e, the model
with risk neutral investors) predicts values of −0.42 and −0.41 respectively. While it is not
reported in the table, it is worth noting that in the data, during the year previous to the
crisis the correlation between output and interest rates is −0.90; therefore the model here
is consistent with a higher co-movement of the series during periods of economic distress, a
result that is not observed for the model of risk neutral investors.
The model also reproduces the counter-cyclical behavior of the trade-balance. The value
of the correlation predicted by both models is lower than the observed value for the data
−0.59, but again, the model with risk aversion performs better than the model with risk
neutrality. The numerical solution of the model shows that the correlation between trade-
balance and output is around −0.48 for the whole period and −0.16 for the year before the
default episode. The alternative model (i.e, the model with risk neutral investors) predicts
values of −0.43 and −0.19 respectively.
The mean default probability is around 1.06% for the model with risk averse investors
and 1.36% for the model with risk neutral investors. This rates are equivalent to annual
default rates of 4.24% and 5.44%. These default rates are higher than the default rate found
elsewhere. However,even though the results of the current model overestimate the default
rate, it is important to highlight that both models, the one with risk averse investors and
the one with risk neutral investors, suffer from the same limitation. 23
The model is also consistent with a few statistics that the previous literature in endo-
geneous sovereign risk cannot account for: First, the model is able to match the negative
23The higher default probability and the lower spread for the period before the default episode found in
this paper for the same calibration than in Arellano (2008) might be the result of using a different solution
method and a different dimension for the economies asset position. In the current paper, the emerging
economy’s asset grid has 600 positions while in Arellano (2008) this grid has 200 positions. As discussed in
Hatchondo and Martinez (2006) models of endogenous sovereign risk are somewhat sensitive to the solution
method employed and how sparse is the grid for the asset position of the economy.
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correlation between a measure of the investors’ performance, the SP500, and Argentina’s
interest spread. In the data, the correlation between these measures is −0.39. The model
generates a value for this correlation of −0.05 for the whole period, with the value of the
correlation rising to −0.11 during the year previous to the default.
Second, in the data, Argentina’s consumption and the SP500 are positively correlated
at 0.35; in the model the correlation between investors wealth and consumption is 0.01 for
the whole period, but the value raises to 0.19 for the year previous to the default episode.
Where the two previous correlations predicted by the model are relatively low in com-
parison to the ones observed in the data, the model might be improved by making investors
subject to some kind of stochastic shocks that represent, for example, changes in interna-
tional interest rates or investors’ own external resources. Including this additional source
of uncertainty in the model could also generate larger spreads,which would also be more in
line with the observed data.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model of default risk that
endogenizes the role of external factors in the determination of small open economies’ in-
centives to default, sovereign bond prices, capital flows and default episodes.
The empirical literature on international finance presents evidence that points to a very
relevant role for investors’ characteristics—risk aversion and wealth—in the determination
of sovereign credit spreads and capital flows to emerging economies. The model in this
paper is the first model with endogenous default risk that can account for these empirical
findings. By relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality on the side of international investors
and assuming that the preferences of these agents exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion,
this model generates a link between international investors’ characteristics and emerging
economies’ sovereign credit markets.
Therefore, the contribution of the paper is twofold. First, the paper qualitatively and
quantitatively characterizes the role of investors’ characteristics in the determination of
small open economies’ optimal plans when international credit contracts cannot be enforced.
Second, the paper presents a theoretical framework that is extended in a companion paper
(Lizarazo (2010)) to a multi-country setup to study endogenous financial links across coun-
tries with common investors. This extension can explain endogenously the occurrence of
contagion in sovereign debt markets of emerging economies.
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Regarding the role of investors’ characteristics, the analytical results of this model es-
tablish that default risk increases with investors’ risk aversion and decreases with investors’
wealth. Investors’ characteristics have the opposite effect on capital flows. Capital flows
decrease with investors’ risk aversion and increase with investors’ wealth. As a consequence,
credit limits are tighter when investors are more risk averse or less wealthy.
Quantitatively, the model developed here outperforms previous models of endogenous
default risk in several ways. Compared to risk-neutral models using the same parameteri-
zations, the current model performs better at explaining sovereign yield spreads levels and
equilibrium debt levels. In comparison to those models with risk neutral investors, the
present model supports a combination of higher levels of debt at equilibrium and higher
and more volatile spreads. The model is also able to replicate the counter-cyclical behavior
of domestic interest rates and the trade balance. The model is also consistent with the
observed positive correlation between measures of investors performance and interest rate
spreads: this model exhibits the expected negative correlation between investors’ wealth
and sovereign spreads.
While the model improves on explaining the behavior of prices and quantities with
respect to models of the same type that do not consider investors’ characteristics, the
model is not without shortcomings. For example, the maximum level of debt supported at
equilibrium is only around 5.1% of the output, which is much lower than the 53.3% average
reached by Argentina at the verge of default reported in Reinhart et al.(2003). Also, from a
computational perspective, the inclusion of an additional state variable (the level of wealth
of the investors) makes solving this problem much more intensive than the simpler model.
Nonetheless the model presented here opens the door to an important economic issue—
that the creditworthiness of a country can be partially explained by factors other than the
country’s own fundamentals. This more general framework can shed light on a multitude
of policy questions: the optimal degree of diversification of international portfolios; the
appropriateness of capital controls to exclude volatile short-term flows; the role of the IMF
in preventing crises; the impact of term-structure on debt markets; and the transmission of
crises from debt markets to equity markets. While these questions remain to be explored, a
clear message emerges from the current analysis: The consideration of risk averse investors
goes a long way toward explaining sovereign bond spreads and the behavior of borrowers
and investors in emerging markets.
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Appendix 1
Proofs
The proofs that follow assume the extreme case of permanent exclusion of credit markets
after default by the emerging economy. This assumption simplifies the proofs because in
this case the value of the value function of default is independent of the investor’s degree
of risk aversion and wealth level. However the results can be generalized to the case of
temporary exclusion using the following argument: In the more general case of temporary
exclusion after a default, the value of the value function of default depends on the risk
aversion and the wealth of the investors but with a discount: the future periods in which the
economy might re-enter the credit market are discounted by the economy’s discount factor
β and by the probability of re-entering credit markets τ , both of which are lower than 1.
This discounting of the future implies that in response to changes in the coefficient of risk
aversion or changes in the level of wealth of the investors, the value function of repayment
must respond more strongly than the value function of default. Therefore the results of
these proofs will also hold for the more general case using the argument of continuity with
respect to the probability of re-entering credit markets that can vary between 0 and 1.
In what follows is important to remember the assumption that the representative in-
vestor does not go short in the emerging economy assets (whenever the emerging economy
is saving the investor receives the savings and invest them completely in T-Bills). This
assumption implies that in equilibrium θ′j ≥ 0 and whenever θ′j > 0 then b′j < 0. Then the
more negative is b′j the more an economy j is able to borrow from the investors.
Proposition 2 For any state of the world s, the emerging economies’ incentives to default
are stronger in a world with a more risk averse representative investor than in a world with
a less risk averse representative investor.
Proof. The investor’s value function can be written as
V L = E
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τv
(
X + θTBt − qfθTBt+1 + dt [θt − qtθt+1]
)
.
Considering the case in which the economy has not defaulted in the current period (otherwise
the investor will not invest in this economy in this period) and assuming an interior solution
for the allocation to the emerging economy’s asset
φ
(
θ′
)
= E
{−qvc (cL (θ′))+ βvc (c′L (θ′)) d′} = 0.
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If the periodic utility of the international investor is of the CRRA type and γL1 < γ
L
2 ,
then there exists a concave function ψ (·) such that v2
(
c; γL2
)
= ψ
(
v1
(
c; γL2
))
. If θ′1 is the
optimal allocation when γL = γL1 , and θ
′
2 is the optimal allocation when γ
L = γL2 then it
holds that
φ1
(
θ′1
)
= E
{−qv1,c (cL (θ′1))+ βv1,c (c′L (θ′1)) d′} = 0.
φ2
(
θ′2
)
= E
{−qv2,c (cL (θ′2))+ βv2,c (c′L (θ′2)) d′} = 0.
Using v2
(
c; γL2
)
= ψ
(
v1
(
c; γL2
))
it is possible to define
φ2
(
θ′1
)
= Eψ′
[
v1
(
θ′1
)] {−qv1,c (cL (θ′1))+ βv1,c (c′L (θ′1)) d′} < 0.
The last inequality comes from the fact that ψ′ (·) is positive and decreasing. The inclusion
of this function in the previous equation implies that φ2 (θ′1) is lower than φ2 (θ′2) because
ψ′ (·) gives little weight to the realizations of d′ = 1, and high weight to the realizations of
d′ = 0. Therefore
φ2
(
θ′2
)
> φ2
(
θ′1
)
.
The concavity of V L (·) implies that given q and the risk of default (represented by the
expected realizations of d′) φ (θ′) is a decreasing function, and as consequence
θ′2 < θ
′
1
which in equilibrium implies b′2 > b′1.
Then for any state of the world s and taking as given q and the risk of default (δ), a
higher degree of risk aversion of the investor would result in this agent allocating a lower
proportion of her portfolio to the economy’s sovereign bonds. Therefore, when the investor
is less risk averse there are financial contracts that are available to the emerging economy
that are not available when the investor is more risk averse. Consequently, given q and δ,
V C1
(
s; γL1
) ≥ V C2 (s; γL2 ) .
Because the utility of autarky for the emerging economy does not depend on the investor’s
risk aversion, it is clear that if for some state of the world, s, default is optimal when
γL = γL1 , then for the same state of the world default would be optimal when γ
L = γL2 .
Additionally, because incentives to default would be higher whenever γL = γL2 , than when
γL = γL1 at equilibrium δ
(
s, b′; γL2
)
> δ
(
s, b′; γL1
)
, and therefore q
(
s, b′; γL2
)
< q
(
s, b′; γL1
)
.
Then, unambiguously for all states of the world, the emerging economy faces stronger
incentives to default when the investor is more risk averse.
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Proposition 3 Default sets are shrinking in assets of the representative investor. For all
W1 < W2, if default is optimal for b in some states y, given W2, then default will be optimal
for b for the same states y, given W1. Therefore D (b |W2) ⊆ D (b |W1)
Proof. Proof: From Equation (9), ifW1 < W2, then for any given q and taking as given
the level of default risk,
b′1 > b
′
2.
This inequality holds because decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that
v
(
X +W1 − qfθTBt+1 − dtqtθt+1
)
is a concave transformation of
v
(
X +W2 − qfθTBt+1 − dtqtθt+1
)
so if θ′1 is the optimal allocation when W = W1, and θ′2 is the optimal allocation when
W =W2, defining
v1 (θ1,t+1) = v
(
X +W1 − qfθTBt+1 − dtqtθ1,t+1
)
v2 (θ2,t+1) = v
(
X +W2 − qfθTBt+1 − dtqtθ2,t+1
)
then
φ1
(
θ′1
)
= E
{−qv1,c (cL (θ′1))+ βv1,c (c′L (θ′1)) d′} = 0,
φ2
(
θ′2
)
= E
{−qv2,c (cL (θ′2))+ βv2,c (c′L (θ′2)) d′} = 0,
and because v1 (θt+1) = ψ (v2 (θt+1))
φ1
(
θ′2
)
= Eψ′
[
v2
(
θ′2
)] {−qv2,c (cL (θ′2))+ βv2,c (c′L (θ′2)) d′} < 0.
The inequality comes from the fact that ψ′ (·) is positive and decreasing. The inclusion
of this function in the previous equation implies that φ1 (θ′2) is lower than φ1 (θ′1) because
ψ′ (·) gives little weight to realizations of d′ = 1, and high weight to realizations of d′ = 0.
Therefore
φ1
(
θ′2
)
< φ1
(
θ′1
)
.
The concavity of V L (·) implies that given q and the risk of default (represented by the
expected realizations of d′), φ (θ′) is a decreasing function, and as consequence
θ′2 > θ
′
1
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which in equilibrium implies b′2 < b′1.
Then for any state of the world s and taking as given q and the risk of default (δ),
a lower level of investor’s wealth would result in this agent allocating a lower proportion
of her portfolio to the economy’s sovereign bonds. Therefore, when the investor is more
wealthy there are financial contracts that are available to the emerging economy that are
not available when the investor is less wealthy. Consequently, given q and δ,
V C1 (s;W2) ≥ V C2 (s;W1) .
Because the utility of autarky for the emerging economy does not depend on the investor’s
wealth, it is clear that if for some state of the world, s, default is optimal when W = W2,
then for the same state of the world default would be optimal whenW =W1. Additionally,
because incentives to default would be higher whenever W = W1, than when W = W2
at equilibrium δ (s, b′;W1) > δ (s, b′;W2), and therefore q (s, b′;W1) < q
(
s, b′;WL2
)
. Then,
unambiguously for all states of the world, the emerging economy faces stronger incentives
to default when the investor is less wealthy.
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